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ABSTRACT
Marijuana-related businesses have blossomed into an industry
with an estimated total market value of $7.2 billion in 2016, with annual
growth projected at 17%. Industry surveys report that 62% of marijuanarelated businesses have offered equity stakes to investors and
approximately one-half of marijuana-related businesses planned to
actively seek investment funding in 2017.
Along with the investment opportunity comes heightened fraud
risk, with regulators cautioning investors against investment due to the
lack of accurate and publicly-available information. Also, despite state-
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level decriminalization, marijuana possession, sale, and distribution
continues to be a crime under federal law. The criminal nature of the
marijuana industry can have ripple effects on investors, even if never
prosecuted.
This paper explores the risks to investors presented by the similar
but distinct doctrines of unclean hands and in pari delicto, both of which
provide that a court should not allow a person engaged in wrongful
conduct to profit therefrom. Because marijuana-related businesses are
criminal enterprises, the doctrines may bar investors from pursuing civil
actions for securities fraud or other misconduct.
Existing case law does not provide sufficient guidance to courts in
resolving the potentially competing policies of securities law enforcement
and controlled substance enforcement. This article therefore proposes a
two-step analysis for courts that would encourage courts to ascertain
whether lawmakers have articulated a clear legislative policy preference
when applying unclean hands and in pari delicto to criminal conduct. If
there is not a clear policy preference, courts should allow the fraud suit to
proceed.
INTRODUCTION
Marijuana-related businesses have blossomed into a market worth
$7.2 billion as of the end of 2016 and projected to grow at an annual
compound rate of 17%,1 despite the fact that marijuana cultivation,
possession, and sale continues to be a crime under the federal Controlled
Substances Act.2 Federal law enforcement has essentially turned a blind
eye as states have decriminalized and instituted marijuana cultivation,
processing, and sale regulatory systems. As of 2017, twenty-one states
have instituted medical-marijuana programs, with another eight states and
the District of Columbia allowing recreational-marijuana sales in addition
to medical sales.3
The phenomenal growth of the marijuana industry represents an
enticing opportunity for prospective investors and an equally enticing
1
Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More Jobs than Manufacturing
by 2020, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/
02/22/marijuana-industry-projected-to-create-more-jobs-than-manufacturing-by2020/#3b2d0a163fa9.
2
21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841 (2018).
3
Brad Finkelstein, Cash Crop; 29 States. 283,000 New Jobs. $50 billion in Annual
Revenue. What will it take for the Mortgage Industry to Capitalize on this Opportunity?, NAT’L
MORTGAGE
NEWS
(Oct.
22,
2017),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/nationalmortgagenews/20171022/
281483571607729.
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opportunity for securities fraud. While federal securities fraud statutes
typically offer protection to defrauded investors, it is a fundamental
principle of equity that a court will not provide a safe-haven to a person
engaged in criminal conduct. Therefore, investors should recognize that
the criminal nature of marijuana-related businesses—even if criminal
prosecution is unlikely—represents a major risk to an investor’s right to
recover for securities fraud committed by the promoters, officers, or other
persons in control of a marijuana-related business.
This article will explore the related but distinct defenses of
unclean hands and in pari delicto, each of which may bar an investor’s
ability to pursue a civil action against officers and directors of the
marijuana-related business for fraud or some other breach of duty. Because
courts are not consistent in applying the defenses,4 investors should be
cautious with regards to investment in marijuana-related businesses until
federal law changes to decriminalize marijuana. Existing law should be
clarified so that investors have a better understanding of when a fraud
action may be barred. The article concludes that when unclean hands or in
pari delicto is raised in a securities fraud action in which criminal business
activities are implicated, courts should bar the action only where
lawmakers have articulated a clear policy with regards to the criminal
activities.
I.

INVESTMENT IN MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES: A
SUMMARY OF REGULATORY CONCERNS AND EXISTING
SCHOLARSHIP

The growth of the marijuana industry has spurred an increased
demand for investors’ capital. Globally, equity investment in marijuanarelated businesses topped $1 billion in 2016.5 According to one industry
survey, within the United States, approximately one-half of operational
marijuana-related businesses either actively sought or planned to actively
seek investment funding in 2017.6 Sixty-two percent of operational
marijuana-related businesses offered equity to investors.7 Investors, on
average, have taken a 15% equity position in marijuana-related
businesses.8
Investors in marijuana have been relatively inexperienced,
however. Less than one-fourth percent reported having been a marijuana
4
T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99 KY. L.J.
62, 68–73 (2010).
5
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY, MARIJUANA BUSINESS FACTBOOK 2017, 272 (Chris Walsh ed.,
5th ed. 2017).
6
Id. at 275.
7
Id. at 280.
8
Id. at 282.
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investor for less than one year; more than three-fourths reported having
fewer than three years of marijuana-related investment experience.9 As
one industry trade group reported in 2017, “[a]lthough investment activity
in the cannabis industry is increasing, big investment firms, venture
capitalists and institutional investors largely remain on the sidelines, wary
of getting involved in an industry that revolves around a federally illegal
substance.”10 Nearly half of investors reported learning about marijuana
investment opportunities online, despite the fact that the marijuana
industry remains largely a collection of “small, privately run businesses
for which little reliable data regarding financial fundamentals is
available.”11 Indeed, investors reported that the baseless financials were
their primary reason for not investing in a marijuana-related business.12
Accordingly, the Securities and Exchange Commission13 (“SEC”)
and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority14 (“FINRA”) have each
issued investor alerts cautioning investors against investment in
marijuana-related businesses due to fraud risks. According to the SEC:
Fraudsters often exploit the latest innovation, technology, product,
or growth industry – in this case, marijuana–to lure investors with the
promise of high returns. Also, for marijuana-related companies that are not
required to report with the SEC, investors may have limited information
about the company’s management, products, services, and finances. When
publicly-available information is scarce, fraudsters can more easily spread
false information about a company, making profits for themselves while
creating losses for unsuspecting investors.15
FINRA cautions specifically about “pump-and-dump” schemes:
Like many investment scams, pitches to invest in potentially
fraudulent marijuana-related companies may arrive in a variety
of ways—faxes, email or text message invitations to webinars,
infomercials, tweets or blog posts. Regardless of how you first
hear about them, the offers almost always contain hallmarks of
"pump and dump" ploys. Specifically, fraudsters lure investors
with aggressive, optimistic—and potentially false and
9

Id. at 283.
Id. at 272.
11
Id. at 292.
12
Id. at 294.
13
Investor Alert: Marijuana Related Investments, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(May 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ia_marijuana.html.
14
Marijuana Stock Scams, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/updatedmarijuana-stock-scams (last updated May 24, 2014).
15
Investor Alert: Marijuana Related Investments, supra note 13.
10
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misleading—statements or information designed to create
unwarranted demand for shares of a small, thinly traded
company with little or no history of financial success (the
pump). Once share prices and volumes reach a peak, the cons
behind the scam sell off their shares at a profit, leaving investors
with worthless stock (the dump).16

Since 2014, the SEC suspended the trading of securities or began
enforcement actions against several marijuana-related businesses over
concerns about misrepresentations of financial and operational
information.17
Despite the growing number of investors and regulatory concerns
about misleading information, there is very little scholarship addressing
the rights of investors who are defrauded by promoters or persons in
control of marijuana-related businesses. Current marijuana legal research
largely focuses on the tension between federal regulation and state
legalization efforts.18 Scholarship on the legality of marijuana-related
businesses tends to focus on the businesses themselves and their right to
enforce contracts, as well as the ability to assert other rights given the
illegality of marijuana under federal law.19 Luke Scheuer addressed the
potential that marijuana contracts are unenforceable illegal contracts,20 as
well as managers’ ability to fulfill fiduciary duties and the availability of
limited liability protection.21 Lauren A. Newell examined whether
Colorado’s Retail Marijuana Amendment implicitly permits a marijuanarelated business to form as a partnership, despite the general rule that a
partnership may not be formed for an illegal purpose.22
16

Marijuana Stock Scams, supra note 14.
See, e.g., Trading Suspension, Exchange Act Release No. 71,723, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,201
(March 14, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2014/34-71723.pdf; Trading
Suspension, Exchange Act Release No. 72,337, 79 Fed. Reg. 33,254 (June 6, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2014/34-72337.pdf;
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission v. Fortitude Group, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00050-SPB (W.D. Pa. filed Feb.
29, 2016); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Strategic Global Investments, Inc., et al., Civil
Action No. 3:16-cv-00514-H-JLB (S.D. Ca. filed Feb. 29, 2016); Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Hemp, Inc., et al., No. 2:16-cv-1413 (D. Nev. Filed June 20, 2016); Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Notis Global, Inc. (f/k/a Medbox, Inc.), et al., Civil Action No. 2:17-cv01905 (C.D. Cal. filed March 9, 2017).
18
See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 617 (2016).
19
See, e.g., Steven Mare, He Who Comes into Court Must not Come with Green Hands:
The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing Struggle with the Illegality and Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1351 (2016).
20
Luke Scheuer, Are “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.
31 (2015) [hereinafter Scheuer, “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?].
21
Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511 (2015) [hereinafter Scheuer, Marijuana Industry’s Challenge].
22
Lauren A. Newell, Up in Smoke? Unintended Consequences of Retail Marijuana Laws
for Partnerships, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343 (2017).
17
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These scholarly works identify the unclean hands doctrine as a
significant hurdle for marijuana-related businesses. Likewise, this article
will explore the impact of the unclean hands doctrine and the related in
pari delicto doctrine in the marijuana industry. However, this article
distinguishes itself from previous research by focusing on the rights of the
investors when investing in a business that is prohibited by federal law,
such as a marijuana-related business.
II.

DESPITE STATE-LEVEL EFFORTS TO ALLOW MARIJUANA
SALES, FEDERAL LAW CRIMINALIZES ALL MARIJUANARELATED BUSINESSES

While the focus of this article is on the private securities law
implications for investors in the marijuana industry, it is first necessary to
describe the recent—and convoluted—criminal regulation of marijuana.
The word “legalized” is commonly used to describe marijuana-related
businesses operating in compliance with state law, but those businesses
can hardly be said to be in compliance with marijuana regulation as a
whole.23 Marijuana remains illegal—criminally illegal—in all states as a
result of federal law.24
The Controlled Substances Act,25 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801, et
seq., specifies that “any material, compound, mixture, or preparation,
which contains any quantity of” marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols
(“THC”), the psychoactive substance in marijuana,26 is a Schedule I
controlled substance.27 By deeming marijuana and THC as Schedule I
controlled substances, Congress determined that the substances (i) have a
high potential for abuse, (ii) have no currently accepted medical use in the
United States, and (iii) have no accepted safety for use under medical
supervision.28
The Controlled Substances Act likewise deems it unlawful “to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”29 Penalties for violation
23

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 801.
Federal Marijuana Law, AM. FOR SAFE ACCESS, https://www.safeaccessnow.org/
federal_marijuana_law (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
25
The Controlled Substance Act, Pub. L. 91-513, Title II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (1970).
26
Drugs of Abuse (2017), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://
www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-06/drug_of_abuse.pdf (last accessed Oct. 22, 2018).
27
21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2018). But see Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 357 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that the inclusion of THC in the Controlled Substances Act refers only to synthetic
THC and not THC naturally occurring in marijuana).
28
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2018).
29
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018).
24
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range from a $1,000 fine30 to life in prison,31 depending on the amount of
marijuana involved, the violator’s intent, and the criminal history of the
violator.32 In addition, civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation are
possible.33
Obviously, no marijuana grower, processor, or retailer—even in
those states that have authorized marijuana businesses—could openly
operate if such federal prohibitions were actively enforced. Thus, the
growth of the “legal” marijuana industry has been facilitated by two
federal law enforcement-related items: the so-called “Cole Memos,” and
the “Rohrabacher-Farr” appropriations amendment.
The Cole Memos have received much of the media attention with
regards to federal law enforcement’s inaction with regards to marijuana
laws. On August 29, 2013, then-Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
issued a memorandum (the “2013 Cole Memo”) to all United States
Attorneys offering guidance on the use of resources relating to civil and
criminal marijuana law enforcement and prosecutions under the
Controlled Substances Act.34 The 2013 Cole Memo stressed that, although
Congress had determined that marijuana is a dangerous drug, the Justice
Department was focusing its marijuana-related law enforcement efforts on
eight specific priorities:
1. Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
2. Preventing the revenue of marijuana sales from funding criminal
enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
3. Preventing the distribution or diversion of marijuana from states
that have decriminalized marijuana to states that have not;
4. Preventing state-authorized marijuana operations from serving as
a cover or pretext for other drug trafficking or illegal activities;
5. Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and
distribution of marijuana;
6. Preventing driving under the influence of drugs and the
exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences;
7. Preventing growth of marijuana on public lands, and attending to
public safety and environmental concerns related to marijuana
production on public lands; and
30
A first-time conviction of possession of a controlled substance, without intent to
distribute, or distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, is punishable by a
minimum fine of $1,000 and up to one year in prison. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)
(2018).
31
Possession of 1,000 kilograms or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of
marijuana, or 1,000 or more marijuana plants, is punishable by not less than ten years and up to life in
prison. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2018).
32
Id.
33
21 U.S.C. § 844a (2018).
34
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013)
(on file with the Department of Justice).

100 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XII:I
8. Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.35
According to the 2013 Cole Memo, besides these eight priorities,
federal law enforcement had traditionally relied upon—and would expect
to continue to rely upon—state and local law enforcements to address
marijuana through their own drug laws.36 The 2013 Cole Memo advised
that so long as a state marijuana regulatory system is robustly designed
and enforced in accordance with the eight highlighted priorities, federal
law enforcement should focus its resources on whether an operation
complies with such state regulations.37 If federal law enforcement is
concerned about the design and enforcement of the state systems with
regards to the eight priorities, then the 2013 Cole Memo instructs district
attorneys to both challenge the state regulatory systems directly and pursue
actions against individual marijuana violators.38
In sum, the 2013 Cole Memo advises federal district attorneys to
allocate resources to the areas identified by the aforementioned eight law
enforcement priorities, as well as to rely upon local law enforcement for
other marijuana-related matters.39 If local law enforcement’s actions are
inconsistent with the eight priorities, then federal law enforcement could
appropriately direct resources to rectify the situation.40
On February 14, 2014, Deputy Attorney General Cole issued
another memorandum (the “2014 Cole Memo”) that offered guidance to
all United States Attorneys on the 2013 Cole Memo’s delineation of
federal law enforcement efforts concerning marijuana-related business
transactions under the Bank Secrecy Act and other financial crime
statutes.41 The Bank Secrecy Act42 and the regulations developed
thereunder required most financial institutions to file a report with the
Treasury Department regarding any “suspicious transaction relevant to a
possible violation of law or regulation.”43
The 2014 Cole Memo stressed the importance of the eight federal
law enforcement priorities outlined in the 2013 Cole Memo, by instructing
35

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
38
Id. at 3.
39
Id. at 2.
40
Id. at 2–3.
41
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Feb. 14, 2014)
(on file with the Department of Justice).
42
Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91-508, Title II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (1970).
43
31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2018). Note that although § 1020.320 uses the word “bank,” that
term is defined to include other financial organizations, including savings and loan associations and
credit unions chartered under the laws of any state or the United States, or any bank organized under
foreign law. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100.
36
37
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law enforcement agencies to review possible marijuana-related financial
crimes with the eight priorities in mind.44 In addition, the 2014 Cole Memo
referred financial institutions to guidance issued by the Department of
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).45 This
FinCEN guidance is discussed later in this article.46
Opponents have criticized the Cole Memos for the memos’ lack
of clarity as to federal law enforcement’s position on state marijuana
regulatory schemes.47 What is clear, however, is that the Cole Memos were
not binding law—they merely served as guides to best practices for federal
law enforcement agencies.48 Nevertheless, marijuana-related businesses,
their investors, and their state regulators viewed the Cole Memos as a
roadmap to legal compliance.49
Thus, the presidential administration change in 2017 caused
significant concern in the cannabis industry, as a December 2016 industry
survey had revealed that a federal crackdown would be the primary factor
to cause investors to cease investing in marijuana-related businesses.50
Roughly one-third of marijuana investors reported that Donald Trump’s
election caused them to change their company’s growth plans, while
another third were still considering revisions to their plans.51
Indeed, in January 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded
the Cole Memos’ guidance as unnecessary, for Justice Department policies
have always required law enforcement to weigh all relevant factors,
including enforcement priorities, when allocating resources to
prosecutorial efforts.52 However, the Sessions guidance is no clearer than
the Cole Memos—there is no directive to law enforcement agencies to take
any action with regards to marijuana. Thus, the Cole Memos may
nevertheless serve as loose guidance with regards to law enforcement
priorities.
The other significant limitation on federal law enforcement of the
marijuana industry does have the force of law: the Rohrabacher-Farr
appropriations amendment. Introduced by a bipartisan group led by Rep.
44

Cole, supra note 41, at 1–2.
Id. at 3.
46
See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
47
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Houser, Legalizing Marijuana: State and Federal Issue: What
Inconsistent Federal Policy Means for Marijuana Business Owners: Washington's I-502 and the
Federal Controlled Substances Act, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 305, 327 (2014); Scheuer, Marijuana Industry’s
Challenge, supra note 21, at 524–26.
48
Id.
49
Mona Zhang, Marijuana Investors Aren’t Scared by Sessions’ Change in Pot Policy,
FORBES (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/monazhang/2018/01/06/marijuana-investorsarent-scared-by-sessions-change-in-pot-policy/#744afc480fba.
50
Walsh, supra note 5, at 295.
51
Id. at 296.
52
Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018)
(on file with the Department of Justice).
45
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Dana Rohrabacher and Rep. Sam Farr,53 Rohrabacher-Farr amended the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act 2015 to prohibit
the Justice Department from using any appropriated funds to interfere with
or prevent the implementation of medical marijuana laws in thirty-two
states plus the District of Columbia.54
All subsequent appropriations bills included the Rohrabacher-Farr
amendment.55 The version appearing in the 2018 appropriations bill covers
forty-six states, two territories, and the District of Columbia:
None of the funds made available under this Act to the
Department of Justice may be used, with respect to any of the
States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, or with respect to the
District of Columbia, Guam, or Puerto Rico, to prevent any of
them from implementing their own laws that authorize the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.56

The Justice Department’s initial position on Rohrabacher-Farr
was that the prohibition barred enforcement action only against the states
(or state officials) directly—that is, it did not prevent prosecution, civil
enforcement, or asset forfeiture actions against individual violators of
federal marijuana statutes.57 Instead, the Justice Department continued to
defer to the eight priorities outlined in the 2013 Cole Memo in determining

53

See 160 Cong. Rec. H4878 (daily ed. May 28, 2014).
Pub. L. 113-235, Title V, § 538; 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014)
55
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242,
2332–33 (2015); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. 115-31, § 537, 131 Stat. 135 (2017);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, § 538, 132 Stat. 348 (2018).
56
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, § 538, 132 Stat. 348 (2018).
57
Patty Stemler, Guidance Regarding the Effect of Section 538 of the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 on Prosecutions and Civil Enforcement and Forfeiture
Actions Under the Controlled Substances Act, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/doc/273620932/
Depart-of-Justice-S;ays-Medical-Marijuana-Law-Doesn-t-Impact-Prosecutions
(last
visited June 29, 2018).
54
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whether to proceed with an enforcement action.58 Courts considering the
Justice Department’s strict interpretation have generally dismissed it.59
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in United States v. McIntosh is
instructive. McIntosh involved ten consolidated interlocutory appeals and
petitions for writs of mandamus from three district courts.60 In each of the
cases, the defendants were indicted for alleged marijuana grow operations
in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.61 However, the defendants’
operations were within states covered by Rohrabacher-Farr. Accordingly,
the defendants sought to enjoin their respective prosecutions on the basis
of Rohrabacher-Farr’s prohibition against the use of funds by the
Department of Justice.62
After dispensing with preliminary issues of jurisdiction and
standing, the court tackled the statutory text itself. According to the Ninth
Circuit, the plain meaning of the Rohrabacher-Farr text “prohibits DOJ
from spending money on actions that prevent the Medical Marijuana
States’ giving practical effect to their state laws that authorize the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”63 The court
rejected the Justice Department’s interpretation, holding that prosecution
of private individuals prevents states from giving “practical effect” to their
respective medical marijuana laws:
DOJ, without taking any legal action against the Medical
Marijuana States, prevents them from implementing their
laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana by prosecuting
individuals for use, distribution, possession, or cultivation
of medical marijuana that is authorized by such laws. By
officially permitting certain conduct, state law provides
for non-prosecution of individuals who engage in such
conduct. If the federal government prosecutes such
individuals, it has prevented the state from giving
practical effect to its law providing for non-prosecution of
individuals who engage in the permitted conduct.64

58

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Samp, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171732 (E. Dist. Mich. Dec. 13, 2016); Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v.
United States, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183041 n.1 (Dist. Colo. Dec. 1, 2016).
60
McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1168.
61
Id. at 1169.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1176.
64
Id. at 1176–77.
59
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However, the McIntosh court was careful not to allow its ruling to
be interpreted too broadly. The court stressed that only the text of an
appropriations rider—not the expressions of intent in legislative history—
may be considered in determining the scope of the prohibition against the
spending.65 Thus, Rohrabacher-Farr does not forbid any federal
prosecution against persons engaged in the marijuana industry; the
limitation instead applies only (i) to the use of Justice Department funds,
(ii) in the specifically identified states, (iii) to the extent that the use of
funds would prevent the implementation of state laws authorizing the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.
Importantly, under McIntosh, the Justice Department may act
against an individual or business who is not in strict compliance with state
medical marijuana laws because such a prosecution would not prevent the
implementation of state medical marijuana laws.66 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit did not dismiss the criminal indictments. Rather, the court held that
the defendants were entitled to preliminary hearings to determine whether
their conduct strictly complied with all relevant provisions of the state
medical marijuana laws.67
Lastly, the court noted that nothing in Rohrabacher-Farr
decriminalizes marijuana, even for medical use.68 The issue is that the
Department of Justice currently cannot spend funds to prosecute medical
marijuana market participants in the states covered by Rohrabacher-Farr.69
In a footnote, the court acknowledged that anyone in any state—including
those covered by Rohrabacher-Farr—who possesses, distributes, or
manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes commits a
federal crime.70
In addition, even though the Justice Department is limited in its
enforcement abilities, Rohrabacher-Farr’s prohibition does not extend to
agencies within other departments, and therefore federal intervention is
not entirely prohibited.71 For example, the Internal Revenue Service,
which is a part of the Treasury Department, may continue denying
65
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business expense deductions for marijuana-related businesses due to the
fact that they engaged in criminal trafficking of controlled substances.72
Likewise, the United States Border Patrol, under the Department of
Homeland Security, may ask at border checkpoints whether state lawcompliant medical marijuana users are in possession of marijuana.73
Thus, while Rohrabacher-Farr offers some protection against
criminal prosecution (or other enforcement action) by the federal
government, that protection is limited to persons who are in strict
compliance with state medical marijuana laws.74 Those courts
acknowledging the restrictions imposed by Rohrabacher-Farr nevertheless
recognize that marijuana remains illegal under federal law, and there is no
legal protection against legal consequences imposed by other federal
agencies.75 Furthermore, Rohrabacher-Farr offers no protection with
regards to state recreational marijuana statutes.76
III.

SECURITIES FRAUD, INVESTOR RECOVERY RIGHTS, AND
PARTICULAR CONCERNS FOR THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY

The technically criminal, but largely unenforced nature of the
marijuana industry creates complications beyond criminal law,
implicating a number of corporate and business law issues for entities in
the industry. As discussed previously, the scholarship thus far has focused
on the implications for the marijuana-related entities themselves.77 This
article, however, focuses on the implications for investors in such entities
by examining what relief such investors should expect under federal
securities laws given that they are investing in criminal enterprises.
Thus, having reviewed the criminal nature of marijuana-related
businesses, this article now turns to an overview of federal securities law
and the anti-fraud provisions thereunder.78 This article will specifically
focus on Section 12 of the 1933 Securities Act (the “1933 Act”)79 and
72

See Green Solution Retail, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1111, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017).
See Marrufo v. United States Border Patrol, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49109 (D.N.M. Apr.
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marijuana program. Id.
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See id.
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See Green Solution Retail, Inc., 855 F.3d at 1114.
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Mare, supra note 1918; Scheuer, “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, supra note
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”).80
Unless an exemption applies, an investment in a marijuana-related
business likely qualifies as a “security” subject to regulation under both
statutes.81 The United States Supreme Court broadly construed the concept
of a “security” to include any “investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others,”82 which
would almost certainly include an investment in a marijuana-related
business.83
The applicability of a particular federal anti-securities fraud
provision depends on whether the fraud is committed in the context of a
registration of securities or in the context of a purchase or sale. The 1933
Act generally requires that issuers register their securities before offering
the securities to the public.84 Thus, the anti-fraud provisions of Section 12
of the 1933 Act create a private cause of action against any person who
offers to sell a security that is unregistered or who offers to sell a security
and makes a fraudulent statement in connection therewith:
(a) In general. Any person who—
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of
this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by
the provisions of
section 77c of this title, other
than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or
omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable, subject to subsection (b), to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
80
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law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security.85
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, on the other hand, prohibits
securities fraud in the “purchase or sale” of a security:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.86
The SEC has clarified the concept of securities fraud under the
1934 Act with the so-called Rule 10b-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
85
86
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in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.87
The essential difference between Section 12 of the 1933 Act and
Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act is who may be sued: a defrauded investor
may sue only his seller under Section 12 of the 1933 Act but may sue the
person making the fraudulent statement under Rule 10b-5, regardless of
whether that person was involved in a transaction with the defrauded
investor.88
While neither the 1934 Act nor Rule 10b-5 create an express
private cause of action for violations of the federal securities fraud
prohibition, the United States Supreme Court has declared that a private
cause of action is implied by the Act.89 Investors have an express private
cause of action under Section 12 of the 1933 Act.90
Private actions by investors for securities fraud may take the form
of either a direct action or a derivative action.91 A direct action is instituted
by a defrauded investor (usually as a class action) against the defrauding
entity, due to a personal injury suffered by the investor (or class).92 A
derivative claim, on the other hand, arises when an equity investor sues a
wrongdoer for injury suffered by the corporation because the corporation
refuses to pursue the action.93 The injury suffered by the equity investor
(reduction in value of shares due to false information) derives from the
harm suffered by the corporation.94 Most securities fraud claims are
pursued as direct claims as it is a personal injury suffered by the investor
that triggers the recovery right, even if the claim also contains elements of
harm more closely associated with derivative actions.95
In the marijuana-related business context, FINRA’s warning
concerning “pump and dump” schemes reflects the securities fraud
concerns of both Section 12 and Rule 10b-5.96 Information regarding the
potential investment is provided to investors arrives via the use of
“instrumentalities of interstate commerce” such as fax, email, or text
87

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
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messages.97 Aggressive estimates for growth and investment return are
submitted as the “pump” with little actual business history to support the
estimates.98
Additionally, even if the business has a legitimate financial history
to report to potential investors, issues with accuracy or auditability may
make the financial statements misleading. At least nine state public
accounting boards have cautioned accountants about risks and difficulties
related to providing accounting services to marijuana-related businesses.99
Criminal conduct by marijuana-related businesses (even those in full
compliance with state-level regulatory systems) implicates federal antimoney laundering statutes and imposes additional burdens on financial
institutions.100 Virtually any transaction between any financial institution
and any marijuana-related business entity is potentially subject to civil and
criminal penalty.101
FinCEN guidance102 provides some relief but places the burden of
proof on the financial institution to verify that the marijuana-related
business transactions are in compliance with state law and federal
prosecutorial policy.103 Because these and other financial regulatory issues
are governed by Treasury Department regulations, enforcement is not
limited by Rohrabacher-Farr’s restrictions.104 Furthermore, because the
FinCEN guidance was issued in concert with and in reliance upon the nowrevoked Cole Memos, it is unclear whether the guidance may still be relied
upon.105
As a result of the restrictions on financial institutions, marijuanarelated businesses have difficulty obtaining banking and other financial
services. Of the more than 11,300 banks and credit unions in the United
States,106 only 400 (less than 4%) reported that they provided financial

97
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services to marijuana-related businesses as of September 30, 2017.107
Thus, many marijuana-related businesses are cash-only businesses, and
cash-only businesses are more difficult to tax and regulate.108
Additionally, without reliable accounting and assurance systems to verify
financial results, the fraud concerns raised by the SEC and FINRA are
compounded.109
IV.

UNCLEAN HANDS AND IN PARI DELICTO: DIFFICULTIES IN
RESOLVING THE DEFENSES DUE TO INCONSISTENCY IN
APPLICATION AND UNCERTAINTY IN FEDERAL POLICY

To be clear, investors in marijuana-related businesses face a
number of uncertainties that typical investors do not.110 Marijuana is
illegal, so investors face the risk of an enforcement crackdown terminating
the entire industry.111 Furthermore, investors bear additional risks as to the
availability and accuracy of information, as many of the marijuana-related
businesses are un-auditable due to the lack of financial services available
to them.112
Yet these risks relate to the unlawful nature of the marijuanarelated business itself—not to the potentially wrongful nature of an
investment in such a business. If the purchase of securities in an enterprise
that is criminal is itself wrongful, then the investor must be prepared to
overcome the affirmative defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto in
any securities fraud action resulting therefrom. These similar but distinct
defenses essentially bar wrongdoers from seeking a remedy from a court
based on the wrongful conduct. However, understanding the distinction in
the two doctrines—and how courts frequently confuse the two—is helpful
in understanding the additional legal uncertainty that defrauded marijuana
investors face.
Both unclean hands and in pari delicto have their roots in the
equitable maxim, “[h]e that hath committed (an) inequity shall not have
equity.”113 The doctrine of unclean hands is commonly described by the
107
Marijuana Banking Update, FINCEN,
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maxim, “[h]e who comes into equity must come in with clean hands.”114
The doctrine of in pari delicto can be thought of as derivative of the
unclean hands maxim and a separate common law rule.115
Essentially, both doctrines permit courts to refuse to become
involved in a dispute between two wrongdoers.116 The rationale is the
preservation of the legitimacy of the courts: courts should advance
legitimate public policy aims, and where granting relief to one party would
undermine a policy goal, the courts should abstain.117 Thus, application of
either unclean hands or in pari delicto requires that a court examine the
underlying policy goals behind the claims asserted and the wrongful
conduct forming the basis of the defense or defenses.
The doctrines differ in a couple of notable respects, however. First
and foremost is the consideration of the relative fault of the plaintiff
compared to the defendant asserting the defense. In pari delicto translates
to “in equal guilt.”118 Technically, it is therefore applicable only where the
plaintiff’s fault or wrongful conduct is equally or more objectionable than
the defendant’s.119 If the plaintiff has committed some wrong, but that
wrong is not as wrongful as the defendant’s conduct, then strict traditional
application of in pari delicto will not defeat the claim.120 Unclean hands,
on the other hand, does not require that the court compare the relative fault
of plaintiff and defendant.121 The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has
engaged in some wrongful conduct with regards to the claim before the
court.122
Second, despite the merger of law and equity, courts have
traditionally confined unclean hands to actions seeking equitable relief,
whereas in pari delicto is applied to both equitable actions and actions for
legal damages.123 T. Leigh Anenson has found that courts in Wyoming,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
North Dakota, New Jersey, Texas, Illinois, Ohio, Arizona, Colorado, and
114
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Massachusetts have refused to extend unclean hands to actions for legal
damages.124
However, courts are not consistent in distinguishing between
unclean hands and in pari delicto, or confining unclean hands to equitable
actions. The modern trend is to disregard the difference between law and
equity, and apply the doctrines regardless of the nature of the relief
requested.125 Anenson finds more recent decisions from California,
Oregon, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island
extending unclean hands to legal actions.126 Anenson also identifies
decisions from the federal courts of appeal and district courts in the
Eleventh, Fourth, Ninth, Seventh, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits as extending
unclean hands to purely legal actions,127 with the Third Circuit refusing to
do so.128
The law/equity split has particular relevance in the securities law
context, as there has been some debate over the decades as to whether
unclean hands, in pari delicto, or both defenses, may be available in a
particular securities action. For example, in Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., the
Fifth Circuit considered a Rule 10b-5 fraud case in which the defendant
asserted both unclean hands and in pari delicto, arguing that the plaintiff’s
action was barred because the defrauded plaintiff himself intended to use
the false information to defraud others.129 The court held that both unclean
hands and in pari delicto were available defenses, although application of
the defenses was solely within the discretion of the trial court.130
The Third Circuit, less than a decade later, refused to consider
unclean hands in a similar Rule 10b-5 fraud case on the basis that the
plaintiffs sought only damages.131 However, the court cited favorably to
Kuehnert for the proposition that in pari delicto could—and under the facts
of the case, should—bar recovery in a private action under Rule 10b-5.132
The United States Supreme Court addressed the situation in the
following decade in two separate cases. The first, Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, examined whether in pari delicto bars a private
damages action under Rule 10b-5.133 The Court held that it may:
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Accordingly, a private action for damages in these
circumstances may be barred on the grounds of the plaintiff's
own culpability only where (1) as a direct result of his own
actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal
responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and (2)
preclusion of suit would not significantly interfere with the
effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of
the investing public.134

In Pinter v. Dahl, the Court extended the Bateman Eichler rule to
a private action for rescission under Section 12 of the 1933 Act,135 but also
held that in pari delicto would only be appropriate where the plaintiff acted
more as a promoter of the business rather than a mere investor.136 Both
cases adopted a traditional analysis of in pari delicto, emphasizing the
requirement that the plaintiff’s fault must be at least equal to the
defendant’s for the doctrine to apply.137
However, neither case clarifies whether Bateman Eichler’s in pari
delicto rule should extend to situations in which unclean hands may be an
available defense. The rule, as articulated, would suggest that it does. “The
plaintiff’s own culpability”138 is the trigger for both unclean hands and in
pari delicto. But Pinter seemed to caution against equating unclean hands
with in pari delicto:
Contemporary courts have expanded the defense’s application
to situations more closely analogous to those encompassed by
the “unclean hands” doctrine, where the plaintiff has
participated “in some of the same sort of wrongdoing” as the
defendant. In Perma Life, however, the Court concluded that
this broadened construction is not appropriate in litigation
arising under federal regulatory statutes.139

Thus, while there is a clear rule for applying in pari delicto in
federal securities fraud cases, the applicability and scope of the unclean
hands defense is an open question. However, plaintiffs in securities fraud
cases may seek either equitable or legal relief.140 Indeed, for a defrauded
134
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investor, an action for the equitable remedy of rescission or a legal claim
for damages should result in the same outcome if the securities are
virtually worthless, such as in a pump-and-dump scheme.141
Therefore, under the Bateman Eichler rule, the focus
should not be on the technical distinction between unclean hands and in
pari delicto, but instead should be on the policy implications of permitting
either defense. In Bateman Eichler, the Supreme Court recognized the
policy concerns in applying in pari delicto to bar the securities fraud
lawsuit:
We also believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in such
circumstances will best promote the primary objective of the
federal securities laws -- protection of the investing public and
the national economy through the promotion of “a high standard
of business ethics . . . in every facet of the securities industry.”
Although a number of lower courts have reasoned that a broad
rule of caveat tippee would better serve this goal, we believe
the contrary position adopted by other courts represents the
better view.
To begin with, barring private actions in cases such as this
would inexorably result in a number of alleged fraudulent
practices going undetected by the authorities and unremedied.
The SEC has advised us that it “does not have the resources to
police the industry sufficiently to ensure that false tipping does
not occur or is consistently discovered,” and that “[without] the
tippees' assistance, the Commission could not effectively
prosecute false tipping -- a difficult practice to detect.” … The
in pari delicto defense, by denying any incentive to a defrauded
tippee to bring suit against his defrauding tipper, would
significantly undermine this important goal.
Moreover, we believe that deterrence of insider trading
most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement
pressures to bear on the sources of such information -- corporate
insiders and broker-dealers.142
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Thus, Bateman Eichler establishes that the public policy behind
securities fraud actions favors permitting fraud suits to move forward
despite in pari delicto concerns.
But in the context of the marijuana industry, the competing policy
of federal controlled substances enforcement complicates the analysis. As
discussed in depth above, despite the enforcement restrictions imposed by
Rohrabacher-Farr, use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of
marijuana is illegal under federal law.143 A court could recognize the
competing federal policies at issue and defer to the basic maxim
underlying either unclean hands or in pari delicto to dismiss the action: a
court should not give comfort to a person engaged in unlawful conduct.
However, it would not be unreasonable for a court to conclude that
Rohrabacher-Farr is an expression of federal policy itself, and that to the
extent the criminal conduct of the business enterprise is within the scope
of Rohrabacher-Farr (for example, the business operates solely within the
medical marijuana industry within the states or territories covered by
Rohrabacher-Farr and in complete compliance with state law), the
securities law policy priorities should control.144 Thus, courts should
clarify the extent to which unclean hands and in pari delicto apply as a
matter of policy in such circumstances.
V.

TOWARDS A CLEARER RULE FOR UNCLEAN HANDS AND IN
PARI DELICTO IN SECURITIES LAW

In sum, investors in a marijuana-related business not only bear
enhanced risks associated with accuracy and availability of information,
but also enhanced legal risks that any claim for fraud deriving therefrom
will not be allowed. Under current jurisprudence, perhaps the only clear
outcome is that in pari delicto will bar a plaintiff who is an insider or
promoter of the business from recovering.145 Beyond that single factual
determination, other factors that may play into the analysis are (i) whether
the plaintiff pursues an equitable or legal remedy, (ii) whether the
distinction between law and equity matters to the court, (iii) whether the
business engages in the medical marijuana industry only or also in the
143
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recreational segment, (iv) whether the business has fully complied with all
state law requirements, and (v) the plaintiff investor’s knowledge and
belief as to all of the foregoing. Furthermore, because, the application of
either unclean hands or in pari delicto is at the discretion of the court, there
is a greater risk of conflicting decisions from district to district, or even
judge to judge within a district.
Accordingly, the author believes that the courts should clarify and
adopt a clearer rule for the application of unclean hands and in pari delicto
in the securities law context, where the business is alleged to have engaged
in conduct that is prohibited by law. The author would propose the
following two-step rule that is, substantially, in line with current unclean
hands and in pari delicto jurisprudence, but simpler in its application.
First, the court should ascertain whether the plaintiff was an
insider, promoter, or active participant in the fraud; for instance, did the
plaintiff have a duty to protect investors from the fraud perpetrated? If so,
the plaintiff investor’s claim should be barred. Such a rule is consistent
with both Bateman Eichler and Pinter, and both federal securities and
criminal law enforcement policies would be promoted by denying the
investor a remedy.
Second, if the plaintiff investor was not under a duty to protect
others from fraud—that is, the plaintiff was merely an investor in a
business engaging in illegal activities—the court should determine
whether the plaintiff investor at the time of the fraud was aware that the
business was planning to engage in activities clearly prohibited by federal
policy. Was the plaintiff investor willing to ignore the illegal nature of the
business in the quest for profit? If so, the claim should be barred.
This second prong maintains the focus on the plaintiff’s conduct.
If the plaintiff willingly accepts the risk of participating in a clearly illegal
business operation, then the plaintiff’s objections to resulting investment
losses are less concerning from a policy perspective. However, a truly
innocent investor’s claims should not be barred.
The second prong does require the court also to determine whether
there is a clear federal policy on the matter. With regards to marijuana, a
court should conclude that federal policy as to recreational marijuana is
clear—there has been no legislative restriction on criminal enforcement of
recreational marijuana businesses, and therefore, an investor who
knowingly invests in a recreational marijuana business should be willing
to bear the risk associated with participating in an illegal scheme. With
regards to medical marijuana, Congress has established its preferred policy
via Rohrabacher-Farr: the federal government’s intervention in the
medical marijuana industry should be limited. Therefore, innocent
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investors in the medical marijuana industry should be allowed to proceed
with their security fraud claims.
While the foregoing test does not necessarily establish a true
bright-line for courts to apply, it does at least eliminate the need to
distinguish between unclean hands and in pari delicto. Furthermore, it
provides direction on how courts should weigh investor culpability in light
of competing policy provisions, which is where the true analysis under
both unclean hands and in pari delicto lies. It also encourages promoters
or insiders to share information about the nature of the business with
investors by including more explicit disclaimers to any investment
solicitation materials. An investor ignoring such a warning does so at his
or her own peril. Lastly, even though the rule as articulated above is
examined in light of federal marijuana policy, it could be easily adapted to
any number of situations in which federal law enforcement policy may
conflict with federal securities law—conflicts that can be remedied by
clear action on the part of lawmakers.
In sum, the rule protects truly innocent investors whose culpability
stems from inconsistent enforcement and lawmaking by policymakers. It
does not protect investors who blatantly ignore consistent federal policy,
nor does it protect persons who are truly culpable in the fraud itself.
CONCLUSION
Marijuana is criminally illegal. That a majority of states now
permit marijuana sales in some form does not change that fact.
Furthermore, federal limitations on prosecution in those states do not
extend to private actions between industry participants. Accordingly,
investors in marijuana-related businesses—criminal enterprises under
federal law—bear the risk that any action for securities fraud may be
barred by the doctrines of unclean hands and in pari delicto.
However, federal lawmakers bear some blame in creating such a
situation, by their failure to legislatively articulate a clear and consistent
policy with regards to marijuana. Marijuana is criminally prohibited, but
federal law enforcement cannot use any funds to interfere with state
medical marijuana programs. Thus, it is no surprise that investors would
assume that securities fraud claims would not be barred.
Courts, therefore, should clarify existing case law with regards to
unclean hands and in pari delicto in the securities fraud context. While
previous United States Supreme Court cases have permitted claims to
proceed where federal securities law policy was supported, those cases did
not have to weigh competing federal law enforcement priorities against
securities law priorities. In the marijuana-related business context—or in
any context where the business is engaged in activity prohibited by federal
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law—courts must consider the totality of federal policy in determining
whether to permit the action to proceed.
The author proposes a two-step analysis. First, was the plaintiff
investor an insider, promoter, or participant in the fraud, such that the
plaintiff was under a duty to protect other investors from the fraud? If so,
the claim should be dismissed, consistent with current law. Second, was
the plaintiff investor at the time of the fraud aware that the business was
to engage in activities clearly prohibited by federal policy? If so, the action
should be barred. If not, the action should proceed.
In the marijuana context, Congress has established a clear federal
policy as to recreational marijuana: it is criminally illegal to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, marijuana, and Congress has not otherwise restricted
enforcement of this statute. Accordingly, investors in marijuana-related
businesses engaged in the recreational marijuana industry should be
prohibited by the unclean hands or in pari delicto defenses.
However, Congressional policy is not clear as to medical
marijuana, as the Rohrabacher-Farr appropriations amendment prohibits
prosecution or other Justice Department action against participants in
state-authorized medical marijuana programs. Because of this
Congressional action, the stated federal policy is non-intervention in the
medical marijuana industry. Consistent with such policy, investors in
marijuana-related businesses subject to Rohrabacher-Farr protections
should be permitted to pursue federal securities fraud claims.

